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Chapter 1: Overview
This dissertation analyzes the positive and normative implications of systemic
financial crises in emerging economies, in terms of the amplification mechanism
created by the effect of individual agent’s borrowing decisions as a source of spillover
effects to other agents in the economy, through its effect on relative prices. Chapter
2 focuses on the behavior of capital flows, the exchange rate and private default in
a small open economy with access to foreign borrowing using collateralized debt. A
default spillover effect arises because private agents fail to internalize the effect of
individual default on the default incentives of other agents, by reducing the value
of collateral.
Chapter 3 discusses the benefits of having access to state contingent debt in
terms of risk sharing and the frequency of financial crises in emerging economies
with limited access to international capital markets. It also analyzes the normative
implications in terms of the spillover effects of individual debt on other borrowers’
collateral constraints.
In Chapter 2, we analyze the behavior of capital flows, the exchange rate and
the frequency of default during systemic private debt crises in a small open econ-
omy where private agents take collateralized debt in an environment with imperfect
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enforceability of creditor rights. It differs from previous work by analyzing the am-
plification mechanism created by the existence of default spillover effects during
episodes of private debt crises. Individual default generates capital outflows due to
the inability of debt rollover. Capital outflows lead to a real exchange rate depre-
ciation, which lowers the value of non-tradable collateral of other borrowers. This
creates a debt overhang problem, as the value of collateral becomes smaller relative
to the value of debt service, which triggers default of other agents. Default spillover
effects generate an amplification mechanism, as all agents have higher incentives
to default, increasing the incidence of default and the default risk premium and
reducing the ability to borrow from abroad.
In addition, this work analyzes the normative implications of default spillover
effects. This mechanism creates an inefficiency in the borrowing and default behavior
of private agents because, by taking prices as given, they ignore the effect of their
decisions on the valuation of collateral and through it on the default incentives of
other agents. Individual borrowers default more frequently than socially optimal
by ignoring that their individual default creates a chain reaction of defaults. A
defaulting agent leads to a real depreciation because international lenders seize any
collateral they can and flee the country. The exchange rate depreciation lowers the
value of non-tradable collateral, which induces other agents to default as well.
In order to correct this distortion, optimal policy is targeted to align default
incentives with the socially optimal default set, by imposing a higher default penalty
or reducing the cost of repayment, so that private agents have lower incentives to de-
fault. Higher enforcement of creditor rights under the private equilibrium is needed
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to align default incentives to the socially efficient. This differs from previous work,
which focuses on the optimal enforcement of creditor rights from the perspective of
a social planner who can choose the level of enforcement. Due to borrowers’ impa-
tience, it is optimal to fully enforce creditorrights and increase the ability to borrow
more each period.
In Chapter 3, we present an analysis of the effects of developing financial mar-
kets for contingent assets on the degree of risk sharing and their effect on reducing
the size of spillover effects due to credit externalities. It differs from previous work
by presenting a detailed analysis of the risk sharing properties of this financial in-
strument in an environment where an amplification mechanism is triggered through
the spillover effects of individual borrowing on other agents’ borrowing through the
valuation of collateral.
The results in this chapter show that, in an environment with persistent shocks
and collateral constraints, having access to state contingent assets allows for par-
tial hedging against income fluctuations, which reduces the need for precautionary
savings and lowers the incidence of financial crises. Each borrower trades current
tradable income for its expected value, which is positively correlated to the actual
shock but less volatile. Partial exposure to the endowment shock creates a need for
accumulating precautionary savings, but in a smaller magnitude than in an envi-
ronment with bonds only. This result is consistent with previous literature, where
adding access to state contingent bonds reduce the size of precautionary savings and
lead to large transitional gains in terms of welfare.
Additionally, state contingent debt provides partial hedging against the col-
3
lateral constraint. Pro-cyclical interest payments loosen the collateral constraint in
bad states and tightens it in good states of nature, which improves risk transfer
across time. Agents are better able to smooth consumption by increasing their abil-
ity to borrow more in bad states, when the marginal benefit of debt is higher, at the
expense of lowering the collateral limit in good times when the marginal benefit of
debt is lower.
Given the need for precautionary savings, there is a spillover effect as pri-
vate agents do not internalize that individual borrowing decisions reduces the price
of non-tradable collateral and therefore tightens the collateral constraint of other
agents. Therefore, private agents take excessive total debt. In addition, they take
too little state contingent debt by ignoring the hedging properties of this instrument
against the tightening of the collateral constraint in bad states.
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Chapter 2: Default Externalities and Systemic Private Debt Crises
in Emerging Markets
2.1 Introduction
Default episodes in emerging market countries are characterized by reposses-
sion of collateral, large capital outflows and real exchange rate depreciation. When
default takes place, lenders immediately seize whatever collateral they can and con-
vert it into tradable goods. The repossession of collateral in terms of tradable goods
leads to capital outflows because lenders seize collateral and repatriate it, whereas
borrowers are excluded from international capital markets and cannot rollover their
debt. Lenders convert their repossessed assets in domestic currency into foreign
currency so an exchange rate depreciation takes place, which in turn affects the
valuation of domestic currency collateral of other loans.
This work analyzes the behavior of capital flows, the exchange rate and the
frequency of default in a small open economy where private agents borrow from
international capital markets using collateralized debt in an environment with im-
perfect enforceability of creditor rights. Individual default generates capital outflows
because they cannot rollover their debt. Capital outflows lead to a real exchange
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rate depreciation, which lowers the value of non-tradable collateral of other bor-
rowers. This creates a debt overhang problem, as the value of collateral becomes
smaller relative to the value of previously taken debt, which triggers default of other
agents. Default spillover effects generate an amplification mechanism, as all agents
have higher incentives to default, increasing the incidence of default and the default
risk premium of other borrowers and reducing the ability of private agents to borrow
from abroad.
Default spillover effects create an inefficiency in the borrowing behavior of
private agents because, by taking prices as given, they ignore the effect of their
decisions on the valuation of collateral and through it on the default incentives of
other agents. Individual borrowers default more frequently than socially optimal.
An individual defaulting borrower does not internalize that her default leads to a
depreciation in the exchange rate because international lenders will sell any seizable
assets and flee the country. The exchange rate depreciation in turn reduces the
value of non-tradable collateral and induces other borrowers to default, leading to
a chain reaction of defaults.
In order to correct this distortion, optimal policy should focus on aligning
default incentives with the socially optimal default set. Stronger enforcement of
creditor rights through a larger default penalty in terms of repossessed collateral
increases the cost of default and reduces the frequency of default in the decentralized
equilibrium. Likewise, this could also be achieved by policies aimed at lowering the
cost of debt repayment, by reducing the benefit of defaulting in states where the
misalignment takes place.
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The inefficiency created by the distortion in default incentives is completely
different to the one in models with pecuniary externalities in collateral constraints
on the level of debt. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that focuses on the
existence of pecuniary externalities in default incentive constraints, which generates
a chain reaction in defaults, a feature that has been documented during episodes of
systemic debt crises.
The model environment is a two-good endowment economy where lenders seize
a fraction of the individual borrower’s total income in the case of default1. Each
individual borrower has two choices: whether to pay back or default on previously
contracted debt, and if previous debt has been paid back, how much new debt
to take. We derive explicitly the financial contract of collateralized debt with the
possibility of default, which is reflected on an interest rate schedule for each level
of individual debt and analyze whether the debt and default choices in this model
are socially efficient. Once we find the existence of a pecuniary externality effect
on the default cost-benefit analysis, we introduce a policy instrument to correct
this distortion, through a default penalty that is proportional to the total value of
collateral.
The qualitative results show that the model accounts for the three stylized
facts previously mentioned. During an episode of default, lenders partially seize the
borrower’s collateral and repatriate tradable goods. This results in large capital
outflows and real exchange rate depreciation due to a ’transfer problem.’2On the
1Following Uribe (2006), we need a two-good economy for a pecuniary externality to lead to
a socially inefficient equilibrium, as the debt choice is socially efficient in the case of a one-good
economy despite the existence of financial frictions.
2The transfer problem is a term used by Keynes (1929) to refer to the fact that a large transfer
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normative side, private borrowers have higher incentives to default than socially
optimal. As mentioned before, individual default has spillover effects as it leads
to a real depreciation which creates a debt overhang problem for other borrowers
by reducing the value of collateral and increasing the incentives to default for all
borrowers in the economy.
The distortion in default incentives is an additional mechanism to the inef-
ficiency created by the imperfect enforceability problem in the sovereign default
literature. If the social planner could choose the degree of enforceability, she would
choose one that leads to repayment in all states. In our case, even for a fixed degree
of enforcement of creditor rights, there is a distortion in default incentives of pri-
vate borrowers relative to the constrained efficient case. Private borrowers do not
internalize the effect of their borrowing on the default risk premium of other agents
through the effect on the valuation of collateral. In order to correct this distortion,
decentralized agents should lower their incentives to default, which can be achieved
through a stronger enforcement of creditor rights. A higher cost of default makes
private agents internalize the effect of their borrowing in triggering a chain reaction
of other agents’ default, achieve a lower incidence of debt crises and improve risk
sharing and consumption smoothing.
We use quantitative methods to solve for the optimal debt and default choices
in the decentralized equilibrium and the constrained social planner’s problem and
the default penalty to correct the distortion in default incentives in the infinite
between two countries not only has a direct effect in terms of a capital outflow but also an indirect
effect through a change in the terms of trade, especially in the case of a small open economy.
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horizon model. We simulate the economy to analyze the business cycle properties of
the model and the behavior of real variables during default episodes. The results are
consistent with the qualitative analysis, where the decentralized equilibrium shows
higher incentives to default than socially efficient. This translates into a higher
interest rate schedule, due to the effect of the default risk premium, and lower levels
of debt compared to the case with no distortion in default incentives.
The default penalty takes positive values in the set of states where an individ-
ual borrower chooses to default whereas the social planner would not. This occurs
at intermediate levels of debt, as private borrowers would efficiently choose to pay
back low levels of debt and default on high ones. A higher endowment shock reduces
the optimal value of the penalty, as the default penalty is proportional to tradable
endowment. On the debt dimension, higher levels of debt in this set of states require
a higher penalty to increase the cost of default, as the size of the default externality
is increasing in debt.
Literature Review. The theoretical framework in this work is related to
the literature on pecuniary externalities in incentive constraints (Greenwald and
Stiglitz, 1986). In models of imperfect information and incomplete markets, the
market equilibrium in economies with constraints that depend on market prices is
not constrained efficient because the second order welfare loss from reducing default
is smaller than the first order gain from relaxing the default incentives of other
agents. In this model, the market equilibrium is not efficient because of the distortion
that arises in the incentives to default due to the fact that private agents take the
real exchange rate as given.
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The optimal debt contract in this work is also related to the literature on
optimal contract arrangements under the existence of commitment problems, such
as Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000). A more restrictive
version for the financial constraint is used in Zhang (1997), where the maximum
level of debt is determined by the worst case scenario in terms of the exogenous
shock. However, this class of contracts characterize an equilibrium which rules out
default, with debt levels that satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint where
paying back is strictly preferred to default in all states. In this model, I allow for
default to be preferred in a subset of states and define the participation constraint
for risk neutral international lenders that are willing to engage in risky lending.
This work is also related to the vast literature on sovereign default, such as
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989), in the sense that we
analyze an equilibrium where default does take place. Popov and Wiczer (2010)
present a model with centralized default in a two good environment, where sovereign
default episodes occur during periods of currency crises. A closer quantitative model
of sovereign default to this work is the model with no trend shocks in Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006), extended to a two good framework. However, the model differs in
two important features: this paper focuses on private default, where both debt and
default decisions are taken by decentralized borrowers, and debt is collateralized,
whereas in the sovereign debt literature the cost of default is in terms of trade
exclusion or reputation loss.
We can compare the implications of the constrained social planner’s solution
with models of sovereign default. The use of collateral that is subject to valuation
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effects create an additional amplification mechanism through the chain reaction of
defaults. For a given level of debt, individual default creates a real depreciation
that lowers the valuation of non-tradable collateral and triggers a chain reaction of
default, which amplifies the frequency of default.
Other models of private capital flows and default include Wright (2006) and
Daniel (2012). Wright(2006) presents a model of private external debt with resident
default risk, where private agents choose to borrow in both domestic and foreign
capital markets. Daniel (2012) uses a model with private sector risky borrowing for
emerging markets where the interaction between negative productivity shocks and
financial market imperfections lead to a widespread of default and triggers a severe
contraction in external borrowing. Our model would be similar to a representative
agent version of agents who can borrow from domestic and foreign capital markets
and face resident default risk in foreign markets, as the net supply of domestic debt
is zero. We expand this model to allow for an imperfect degree of collateralization,
where the real exchange rate amplifies the default externality.
This work also relates to others that analyze the normative implications in
models with default. Tirole (2003) presents a single good model where a negative
externality arises through a government policy that is set in terms of aggregate
debt, which creates a mis-alignment in default incentives of private agents that take
policy as given and of a government that chooses that policy. Jeske (2006) considers
a default externality in a model where private agents can engage in both domestic
and foreign borrowing and can default on foreign debt but not on domestic debt,
which arises from the possibility of substituting access to foreign markets with access
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to domestic ones. Wright(2006) presents a similar framework with domestic and
external borrowing, where the optimal policy is to subsidize capital flows repayment.
It is also closely related to the model with pecuniary externalities and equilib-
rium default in Kim and Zhang (2012), where they show that decentralized borrow-
ing and centralized default leads to the existence of a pecuniary externality through
the effect of individual debt on the bond price schedule. The distortion in default
incentives in our work is closely related to their bond price schedule effect, where
private agents ignore that higher individual debt leads to a higher default risk pre-
mium. We extend this model by allowing for decentralized default and collateralized
debt, which create an additional distortion on the default incentives of individual
agents through the effect of the real exchange rate on the valuation of collateral.
The normative results in our model can be related to the literature on credit
externalities and financial crises in models with endogenous borrowing constraints.
When default is an off-equilibrium outcome, the pecuniary externality arises as
private agents take excessive debt because they fail to consider the effect of debt
on relative prices, as higher debt lowers the value of collateral and tightens the
financial constraint in the following period. Therefore, the optimal policy, as shown
by Bianchi (2011), Jeanne and Korinek (2010) and Korinek (2008), is one that
reduces the amount of debt. A similar result is also obtained in Jeanne and Korinek
(2010, 2011) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), where total borrowing is higher than
optimal if uncontingent debt is the only financial instrument available.
The inefficiency created by the distortion in default incentives is completely
different to the one in models with inefficient debt levels due to pecuniary externali-
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ties in collateral constraints. The policy recommendations to correct this distortion
is also completely different from the one in models with credit constraints: the dis-
tortion in default incentives can be corrected in the period when default occurs,
whereas in the model with no default distortions, optimal policy is a precautionary
tax that is charged in periods before the economy hits the borrowing constraint.
This work highlights the externality that arises in default incentives through
the effect of individual debt on relative prices. The reason why prices play a key
role in this type of models is related to the link between individual and aggregate
borrowing. As pointed out in Krugman (1999) for the case of currency crises, indi-
vidual debt taking depends on the valuation of wealth. Each agent’s wealth depends
on aggregate borrowing, as the volume of capital inflows affects terms of trade and
through it the valuation of foreign currency denominated debt, which is specially
relevant in the case of a small open economy. In an episode of systemic private
default, a large fraction of borrowers that default on their debt leads to a sizable
real exchange rate depreciation, which exacerbates the current account reversal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model
of private borrowing and default under the decentralized equilibrium and the social
planner’s equilibrium to show that the decentralized equilibrium is not constrained
Pareto efficient. Section 3 presents the results of the quantitative analysis of the
pecuniary externality and its effect on default incentives, as well as the optimal
policy to correct this distortion. Section 4 concludes.
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2.2 Model of Systemic Private Default
This section presents a small open economy model of international borrowing
with collateralized debt to illustrate the interaction mechanism between debt, de-
fault and the real exchange rate in a model with infinite discrete time. There are two
representative agents: a domestic private borrower and a large pool of international
lenders.






where Et(.) is the time t expectations operator, 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor,








where cT,t and cN,t are the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods, respec-
tively, ω is the weight of tradable consumption in the aggregator and 1/(1 + η) is
the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable consumption.
There is a single available instrument to borrow from abroad: a one period,
non-state contingent bond denominated in units of the numeraire tradable good.
Every period each domestic private borrower decides whether to pay back debt
contracted in the previous period, dt, and, if she chooses to do so, she can choose
to take new debt, dt+1, from a large pool of risk neutral lenders . Each domestic
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agent consumes two types of goods, tradable and non-tradable goods, and receives
a stochastic endowment of yt units of the tradable good with p.d.f. f(yt) and y
N
units of the non-tradable good.
At the beginning of each period, borrowers decide whether to default or not.
If a private borrower decides not to default, debt contracted in the previous period
is paid back and new debt is taken. Each borrower chooses consumption of tradable
and non-tradable goods. The budget constraint is given by:
cRT,t + ptc
R
N,t = yt + pty
N + dt+1 − (1 + rt)dt (2.1)
where superscript R refers to the state of repayment and pt is the relative price of
non-tradable goods, or equivalently, 1/pt is a measure of the real exchange rate. The
price of tradable goods is normalized to one.
If a private borrower defaults, lenders seize a fraction 0 < λ1 < 1 of the
borrower’s total income. There is a cost related to this process, so that lenders obtain
a fraction λ2 ≤ λ1 of total income, convert it into tradable goods and repatriate it.3
Defaulters are excluded from international capital markets and regain access with
an exogenous probability φ.4When they regain access to capital markets, agents
start with a zero debt stock. Agents choose their consumption of tradable and non-
tradable goods. The budget constraint in the default state, with superscript D, is
3λ1 and λ2 are exogenous in this setup, but can be loosely related to the degree of enforcement
of creditors’ rights. See Djankov et al (2008) for references to the cost of private default and the
value recovered by lenders. For the case study of a medium sized firm, they find that, on average,
48 percent of the value is lost during the debt enforcement process.
4We need some source of dead-weight loss due to default in order to obtain a pecuniary exter-
nality, which is obtained by setting λ2 < λ1 and/or φ < 1. A detailed explanation of this is shown





N,t = (1− λ1)(yt + ptyN) (2.2)
If a private borrower defaults, there is a probability 1 − φ of staying in autarky,
where they consume their endowments of tradable and non-tradable goods. The
budget constraint in the autarky state, with superscript A, is given by:
cAT,t + ptc
A
N,t = yt + pty
N (2.3)
The key feature in this setup is the fact that both tradable and non-tradable goods
can be used as collateral. In the case of default, when lenders repossess non-tradable
collateral, they would sell it against tradable goods which can be repatriated to
lenders. 5
This feature reflects in the market clearing condition for tradable goods under
default. The demand of tradable goods by international lenders is given by the total
value of seized collateral λ2[yt + pty
N ]. The demand of tradable goods by domestic
agents is their consumption of tradable goods in the default state, cDT,t. Supply
is given by the endowment of tradable goods, yt. Therefore, the market clearing
condition for tradable goods in the state of default is:
cDT,t + λ1(yt + pty
N) = yt (2.4)
International lenders. There is a large pool of risk neutral international
lenders. The interest schedule is derived a participation constraint that ensures that
5Tornell and Westermann (2005) provide empirical evidence on the use of non-tradable goods as
collateral, where external financing fuels credit booms in the non-tradable sector. Korinek (2011)
points out the use of real estate collateral during many capital inflow booms and busts.
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lenders are indifferent between engaging in risky lending to domestic borrowers and
their riskless outside option. This pins down an interest rate schedule that depends
on individual borrowing, r(d). Lenders receive (1 + r)d if a borrower decides to pay
back and they seize a fraction λ2 ≤ λ1 of total income if the borrower defaults. The








N)f(yt)dyt = (1 + ρ)dt (2.5)
where ρ is the world risk free interest rate, ȳ and y are the upper and lower bounds
for the tradable endowment distribution, respectively, and ŷ is the default threshold
for the tradable endowment shock, which will be defined in the next section. For a
given level of debt, lenders get repaid when tradable endowment is higher than the
threshold, yt ≥ ŷt, and default takes place otherwise.
2.2.1 Decentralized equilibrium
We present the problem faced by a representative borrower in recursive form.
The state at the beginning of the period is given by (d, y), where d is the stock
of previously contracted debt and y is the tradable endowment shock. In states of
repayment, labeled with superscript R, a private borrower chooses new debt, d′, and
pays back debt contracted on the previous period.















N = y + d







(y + pyN)f(y)dy = (1 + ρ)d (2.8)
where cRT and c
R
N are the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods, respec-
tively, p = p(d, y) is the price of non-tradable goods and r = r(d) is the interest rate
schedule.6ŷ(d, y) is the threshold for the tradable endowment shock below which
private borrowers default. V (d, y) is the welfare value of an agent with debt stock
d and tradable endowment y.
Individual borrowers repay their debt if welfare under repayment, vR, is higher
than under default, vD.Therefore, the repayment condition is given by:
vR(d, y) ≥ vD(d, y) (2.9)
We can show that there exists a threshold for the tradable endowment shock,
ŷ, such that agents choose to pay back debt for realizations of y ≥ ŷ and default
otherwise.7The repayment condition shows that each borrower defaults under low
realizations of the tradable income shock because the cost of default is increasing in
y. The threshold is defined by:
vR(d, ŷ) = vD(d, ŷ) (2.10)
If a private agent defaults, lenders seize a fraction 0 < λ1 < 1 of total income.
There is a dead-weight cost of default as lenders repatriate a fraction 0 < λ2 ≤ λ1
6The interest rate schedule depends on both aggregate and individual debt because default risk
is calculated for each individual borrower depending on her individual debt level but the recovery
value of collateral depends on the price of non-tradable goods and therefore on aggregate debt.
7See Appendix A.1.
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of total income in terms of tradable goods. Agents who default are banned from
borrowing in international capital markets and go into autarky. They regain access
to financial markets with a probability φ and re-enter capital markets with no initial
debt. We label this state with superscript D for default.














N = (1− λ1)y + (1− λ1)pyN (2.12)
As long as private agents stay in autarky, they consume their income. We label this















N = y + py
N (2.14)
In every state, a private borrower’s welfare is defined by V (d, y), where repay-
ment is chosen if welfare under repayment, vR(d, y), is higher than under default,
vD(d, y), and default is chosen otherwise.
V (d, y) = max{vR(d, y), vD(d, y)} (2.15)
Definition 1 A recursive decentralized competitive equilibrium for a small open
economy (SOE) is a pricing function, p(d, y), an interest rate schedule, r(d), and
decision rules { d′(d, y), cRT (d, y), cDT (d, y), cAT (y), cRN(d, y), cDN(d, y), cAN(y), ŷ(d, y)}
such that the following conditions hold:
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• Household’s problem: Taking p(d, y) and r(d) as given, decision rules d′(d, y),
cRT (d, y), c
R
N(d, y) and ŷ(d, y) maximize (2.6) subject to (2.7), (2.8) and (2.10);
decision rules cDT (d, y) and c
D
N(d, y) maximize (2.11) subject to (2.12); and
decision rules cAT (y) and c
A
N(y) maximize (2.13) subject to (2.14).
• Market clearing: cRN(d, y) = yN , cDN(d, y) = yN , cAN(y) = yN , cRT (d, y) = y +
d′(d, y)− (1 + r(d))d, cDT (d, y) = (1− λ1)y − λ1p(d, y)yN , cAT (y) = y
Assuming that the interest rate schedule is differentiable everywhere, the inter-


















The optimal debt choice considers the effect of debt on the risk premium,
which can be decomposed in two parts. Similar to models with uncollateralized
debt, the first term is given by the probability of repayment in the denominator.
Higher debt reduces the probability of repayment, as it increases default incentives
because more resources are needed to pay back debt. The second term is related
to the marginal loss of default due to the repatriation of collateral by lenders. The
square bracket represents the marginal loss of default, as lenders get the repatriation
of collateral instead of the interest rate payment. Higher debt increases the value of
repayment relative to collateral, which increases the probability of default, shown
8The infinite horizon problem is solved numerically using value function iteration in Section 3.
We find that it is differentiable almost everywhere, except at the threshold where the probability of
default becomes positive. The optimal choice of borrowing at this level is discussed in the section
on the quantitative analysis. and shows the same result for the default externality.
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by the term ∂ŷt+1/∂dt+1. Lenders must receive a higher interest rate in order to be
willing to engage in risky lending.
2.2.2 Social Planner
Consider now a benevolent social planner who faces the same financial contract
with limited enforcement in international capital markets. As opposed to private
borrowers, the constrained social planner does internalize default spillover effects,
through the effect of individual default on the valuation of non-tradable collateral
and through it on the default incentives of other agents in the economy. As a result,
we can show that the decentralized equilibrium is not constrained Pareto efficient.
Under repayment, the planner gets a similar pay-off to the one described for
private agents. The planner’s welfare under repayment wR at initial state (d, y) is
given by:










+ βEW (d′, y′) (2.17)
subject to:
cRT = y + d












yN)f(y)dy = (1 + ρ)d (2.20)
wR(d, ŷ) = wD(ŷ) (2.21)
where U2/U1 is the marginal rate of substitution between tradable and non-tradable
goods.
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Under default, the planner’s welfare is defined as:










+ β(1− φ)EwA(y′) + βφEwR(0, y′) (2.22)
subject to:




cDN = yN (2.24)











+ β(1− φ)EwA(y′) + βφEwR(0, y′) (2.25)
subject to:
cAT = y (2.26)
cAN = yN (2.27)
In each state, the planner’s welfare is defined by W (d, y), where repayment is chosen
if welfare under repayment, wR(d, y), is higher than under default, wD(y), and
default is chosen otherwise.
W (d, y) = max{wR(d, y), wD(y)} (2.28)
Definition 2 A socially efficient allocation for the small open economy (SOE) is a
set of decision rules {d′(d, y), cRT (d, y), cDT (d, y), cAT (d, y), cRN(d, y), cDN(d, y), cAN(d, y),
ŷ(d, y)} and an interest rate schedule r(d, y) such that decision rules cRT (d, y), cRN(d, y),
d′(d, y) and ŷ(d, y) and the interest rate schedule maximize (2.17) subject to (2.18)-
(2.21); decision rules cDT (d, y) and c
D
N(d, y) maximize (2.22) subject to (2.23) and
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(2.24); and decision rules cAT (d, y) and c
A
N(d, y) maximize (2.25) subject to (2.26)
and (2.27).





































Proposition 1 For a given level of debt, private borrowers in the decentralized equi-
librium face a higher marginal effect of debt on the incentives to default than the








Proof. Using the results in Appendix 1, we can derive the analytical expression
for the marginal effect of debt on the default threshold under the decentralized



















U1(ĉR)− (1− λ1)U1(ĉD) + λ1 ∂p̂∂ĉT y
NU1(ĉD)
(2.31)









Let us analyze the debt and default decisions of a constrained social planner.
The optimality condition for debt considers the same relationship as the one obtained
by decentralized individuals, where a larger stock of debt leads to higher incentives to
default, given the increase in the cost of repayment relative to the value of collateral.
In addition, it considers the effect of individual debt and default on the valuation of
collateral. There are two effects on the valuation of collateral: the first one related
to the value of collateral for a given default set and the second effect related to the
distortion in incentives to default. These effects are similar to the ones labeled ’over-
borrowing’ and bond price schedule effect in Kim and Zhang (2012), but extended
to the case of collateralized debt and decentralized default.




∂pt+1/∂dt+1f(yt+1)dyt+1, which shows that, for a given default set, higher
debt leads to a lower valuation of collateral and therefore, lenders must increase the
cost of borrowing to compensate for lost resources. This leads to a social planner
choosing a lower level of debt than private borrowers.
The second effect is the one related to the distortion in default incentives,









. Appendix 1 presents the analytical solution
for the private borrower’s problem in the decentralized equilibrium and the social
planner’s problem. A social planner that internalizes the effect of debt and default
on the price of non-tradable goods has lower incentives to default because individual
default leads to a chain reaction of defaults by affecting the valuation of other agents’
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collateral, shown by the term containing ∂p̂t+1/∂dt+1.
The result on the distortion in default incentives implies that private borrowers
face a higher default risk premium, which results in a lower level of debt compared
to the case where the default incentives are perfectly aligned to the socially optimal.
Clearly, the total effect on the level of debt depends on the relative magnitude of
the two previously mentioned effects.9
A key assumption to obtain a distortion in default incentives is that default
creates a dead-weight loss, given by the difference between (1+r)d and λ2py
N . This
can be achieved by lenders having to incur in a dead-weight cost to seize collateral,
convert it to tradable goods and repatriate it, λ2 < λ1, and/or loss of access to
international capital markets, φ < 1. Appendix A.3 shows that in a model with no
dead-weight cost of default, private agents face the same default incentives as the
socially optimal. If there is no marginal loss of default, agents would face the same
interest rate schedule and choose the same optimal level of debt.
In order to correct the distortion in default incentives, it would be welfare
improving to have policies that enforce debt repayment and reduce the frequency of
default, as it would increase the benefits of risk sharing by allowing private agents
to borrow more under bad states of the economy.
9If we consider the case where default is exogenous, we would have no distortion in default
incentives, so that this is the only effect that remains in place. For a derivation of that case, see
Appendix A.4: Exogenous Default. It is not just allowing for default to occur in equilibrium which
results in lower borrowing but the distortion in default incentives between the socially efficient set
of states and the ones chosen by decentralized agents.
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2.2.3 Optimal Policy to Correct Default Distortion
In this section, we analyze the type of policy needed to correct the distortion
on private agents’ incentives to default. By taking prices as given, borrowers do
not internalize the effect of individual default on the valuation of other borrower’s
collateral. We show that the constrained efficient equilibrium can be achieved by
including a default penalty which increases the cost of default and reduces incentives
to default so as to match the socially optimal default set. We introduce a default
penalty, τ(d, y), that is proportional to the value of collateral and the income from
the default penalty is given back to all agents as a lump sum transfer, T .10In this
way, we are only directly affecting the default incentives for borrowers but not the
amount of collateral seized by lenders. In practice, this could be enforced by taking
away any additional assets to further penalize private agents who choose to default.
The policy instruments affect the budget constraint under the default state to
include both the default penalty and the lump sum transfer.
cDT + pc
D
N = (1− λ1(1 + τ))y + (1− λ1(1 + τ))pyN + T (2.32)
Definition 3 A recursive decentralized competitive equilibrium with default penal-
ties for the small open economy (SOE) is a pricing function p(d, y), an interest rate
schedule r(d), a default penalty τ(d, y), a lump-sum transfer, T (d, y) and decision
rules {d′(d, y), cRT (d, y), cDT (d, y), cAT (y), cRN(d, y), cDN(d, y), cAN(y), ŷ(d, y)} such that
the following conditions hold:
10For the full derivation of this result, see Appendix A.2.
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• Household’s problem: Taking {p(d, y), r(d), τ(d, y), T (d, y)} as given, decision
rules {d′(d, y), cRT (d, y), cRN(d, y), ŷ(d, y)} maximize (2.6) subject to (2.7), (2.8)
and (2.10); decision rules {cDT (d, y), cDN(d, y)} maximize (2.11) subject to (2.32)
; and decision rules {cAT (y), cAN(y)} maximize (2.13) subject to (2.14).
• Market clearing: cRN(d, y) = yN , cDN(d, y) = yN , cAN(y) = yN , cRT (d, y) = y +
d′(d, y)− (1 + r(d))d, cDT (d, y) = (1−λ1)y−λ1p(d, y)yN , cAT (y) = y, T (d, y) =
τ(d, y)λ1(y + p(d, y)y
N)
The value of the default penalty, τ(d, y), that corrects the distortion in default
incentives is characterized by:
(1 + r)U1(ĉ
R)








U1(ĉR)− (1− λ1)U1(ĉD) + λ1 ∂p̂∂ĉT yNU1(ĉD)
(2.33)
where ĉ and p̂ are consumption and prices at initial state (d, ŷ).
2.3 Quantitative Analysis
This section presents the quantitative implications of the default externality.
We solve the decentralized equilibrium and the constrained social planner’s problem
numerically using global non-linear methods, which are described in Appendix A.6.
In order to analyze the quantitative properties of the model, we obtain the policy
rules, default decisions and the price of debt under each state. We simulate the




σ 2 CRRA coefficient
ρ 0.01 Risk-free interest rate Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)
ω 0.3 Tradable consumption coefficient Bianchi (2011)
1
1+η
0.8 Elasticity of substitution between Bianchi (2011)
tradable and non-tradable goods
φ 0.125 Access to capital markets Mendoza and Yue (2011)
λ1 = λ2 0.1 Income seized under default AG (2006)
β 0.93 Discount factor Target: Debt-to-GDP ratio of 20 percent
ρy 0.9 AR(1) coefficient AG (2006)
ξ 0.034 Standard deviation AG (2006)
Table 2.1: Parameter Values
2.3.1 Parameter Values and Functional Forms
The numerical solution takes parameters from calibrations based on data for
Argentina, following other models that analyze credit externalities, such as Bianchi
(2011), and on-equilibrium default, such as Aguiar and Gopinath (2006, AG here-
after). A period in our model represents a quarter. The values of the parameters
used in this exercise are listed in Table (2.1).
Agents preferences are given by a CRRA utility in terms of the composite
consumption good (c), which is a CES aggregator of the consumption of tradable








The risk free interest rate, ρ, is set to 1 percent, which is a standard value used
in the open macroeconomics literature for quarterly risk-free interest rate. The risk
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aversion coefficient, σ, is set at a value of 2. The probability of re-entering the credit
market after default, φ, is set at 0.125, which implies an average exclusion period of
about 10 quarters, consistent with an average exclusion of 2.5 years for Argentina.
The weight on tradable consumption in the consumption aggregator, ω, is set at 0.3
and the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable consumption,
1/(1 + η) is set at 0.8, following Bianchi (2011).
We should note that the elasticity of substitution is of key importance in the
size of the default externality, as it drives the size of the real exchange rate depre-
ciation when default takes place. For a given reduction in tradable consumption,
a higher elasticity implies a smaller exchange rate depreciation, and therefore we
should expect weaker spillover effects from the default externality.
Another key parameter in the model is the fraction of seized collateral, λ1.
This parameter differs from other models with default as it is related to a loss in
terms of collateral. We use a value that is consistent with Aguiar and Gopinath’s
value of 2 percent loss for every period. The discount factor, β, is set to match a
ratio of debt-to-GDP of 20 percent. λ2 is set equal to λ1 which is the case with the
smallest dead-weight loss and would therefore lead to a smaller default externality
case. This gives a value for the fraction of income seized by the court when the
borrower defaults, λ1, of 0.1 and a discount rate β of 0.93.
The stochastic process for tradable output follows a log-normal AR(1) process,
log(yt) = ρy log(yt−1) + ε
y
t , where E[ε
y] = 0 and E[εy2]=ξ2. The parameters are set
to ρy = 0.9 and ξ = 0.034. It is necessary to create a large number of values for
the discretized representation of the shock in order to get default as an equilibrium
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outcome, as mentioned in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). There-
fore, the shock is discretized to a 25-state Markov chain, following the procedure
proposed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991).
2.3.2 Results
We present the default choice of private borrowers to show that they differ
from those of the social planner and then simulate it to analyze the business cycle
properties and crisis dynamics of this model.























Figure 2.1: Default decision under the decentralized equilibrium and constrained plan-
ner’s problem
Figure (2.1) presents the default decisions for private individuals and the social
planner for a set of states. The x-axis shows different values of debt (net assets)
and the y-axis shows different values of the tradable endowment shock. The blue
and green lines depict the default threshold for the social planner and decentralized
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borrowers, respectively. The area on the left of the default threshold is the default
region, where default is more likely to occur under high levels of debt (or low levels of
net assets) and low levels of tradable endowment. For a given value of the endowment
shock, agents have higher incentives to default under high levels of debt because
higher debt increases the cost of repayment relative to default. For a given level of
debt, agents have higher incentives to default under low levels of the endowment
shock, as the value of seized collateral is increasing in tradable endowment.
By comparing the default sets, we observe that a distortion arises in the middle
region because private agents ignore that default creates a spillover effect through the
valuation of collateral. This is depicted by the region between the blue and green
lines where decentralized agents default, whereas the constrained social planner
repays debt. Default spillover effects are only relevant for intermediate levels of
debt because, for high levels of debt, the cost of repayment is very large so that,
even taking into account spillover effects, it is optimal to default. Likewise, for very
low levels of debt, the cost of repayment is very small so that both private borrowers
and constrained social planner choose not to default.
Figure (2.2) shows the price of new debt for the social planner (SP) and for
individual borrowers (CE) under different states. The low state (LOW) refers to
one where agents are highly indebted and get a low endowment shock. The high
state (HIGH) refers to one where borrowers have low initial debt and get a high
endowment shock. Consistent with default occurring more frequently under a low
endowment shock and a high level of debt, as shown in Figure (2.1), the default risk
premium is lower so that the price of debt is higher in the high state.
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Given the higher probability of default for decentralized borrowers, interna-
tional lenders charge a higher interest rate to be willing to engage in riskier lending,
which translates into a lower price of debt for private borrowers. This result is con-
sistent with the bond price schedule effect in Kim and Zhang (2012). Notice that
because private borrowers have higher incentives to default, the maximum value of
debt that they would repay is lower than the socially optimal, which is shown at the
debt level where there is a change in the concavity of the price of debt. At values
above this maximum debt limit, there are no values of tradable income at which
borrowers repay, so they always get the value of their collateral, given by a fraction
λ2 of total income.




















Figure 2.2: Price of debt
The debt choice in the private equilibrium considers two effects related to the
valuation of collateral. The first effect is the one given by the recovery value of
collateral on the interest rate schedule. If default incentives were perfectly aligned,
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such as in models with an exogenous frequency of default, private borrowers would
take more debt than the social planner.11The second effect is the one introduced
by the distortion in default incentives. The decentralized equilibrium has higher
default incentives and a lower price of debt, which reduce the marginal benefit of
taking new debt. This leads to lower debt in the decentralized equilibrium than in
the social planner’s problem. The final effect on the level of debt depends on the
relative magnitude of these two effects.

























Figure 2.3: Policy rule for a negative 1 s.d. tradable endowment shock
Figure (2.3) presents the policy rule for new debt for a tradable shock that
is one standard deviation below the mean. It shows that the social planner (SP)
11A qualitative analysis of the pecuniary externality with exogenous default is presented in
Appendix A.4. This result is also consistent with models with endogenous borrowing constraints
and no default such as Bianchi (2011) and Korinek (2010).
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chooses a higher level of debt than decentralized agents (CE), which is the case
where the bond price schedule effect is larger than the over-borrowing effect. Note
that, under high levels of debt, agents would choose to default, which is shown by
the value of 0 debt for high levels of debt. Higher default incentives for private
borrowers is shown by the fact that the policy rule goes back to a value of 0 under
a lower level of debt than the social planner.
In contrast to an economy with no financial frictions, this economy faces an
upper limit on the level of optimal debt, as there is a level above which it is always
optimal to default, regardless of the value of the tradable income shock. Figure (2.3)
shows that this limit is also lower for decentralized agents. The lack of commitment
to pay back debt in the optimal set of states translates into a lower price of debt
and to lower levels of debt than in an environment with no distortion on default
incentives.
Standard Deviation SP CE
Output 0.0450 0.0457
Interest Rate 0.0012 0.0013
Trade Balance 0.002 0.008
Consumption 0.0459 0.0469
Correlations with Output
Interest Rate 0.1295 -0.0455
Trade Balance -0.2145 -0.1662
Default Frequency 0.0706 0.1514
Debt to GDP 0.2123 0.20
Table 2.2: Business cycle statistics
In order to analyze the behavior of real aggregates and the default externality
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effects during systemic private default episodes, we simulate the economy for 10,000
periods for the same path of the income shock for the decentralized equilibrium
and the social planner’s equilibrium. We obtain some descriptive statistics on the
behavior of real aggregates under the two settings. Table (2.2) summarizes the main
results.
The simulation results show some standard stylized facts for business cycles in
small open economies. Consumption volatility is higher than output volatility due to
the financial friction, as agents face limited risk sharing due to higher default risk in
the states where they need to borrow to smooth consumption. The volatility of the
interest rate is extremely low because of the low frequency of default in the model.
12There is a negative correlation between output and the interest rate, suggesting
that default risk increases the most under low states of the tradable income shock.
Comparing the debt levels under the decentralized equilibrium and the socially
optimal, we get higher average debt for the social planner, consistent with the policy
rules shown in Figure (2.3), as well as higher frequency of default in the private
equilibrium. Comparing the numerical results with Aguiar and Gopinath (2006),
the amplification mechanism created by the relative price of non-tradable goods
allows us to obtain a higher frequency of default (0.15 compared to 0.02 percent).
Compared to models with centralized default, the chain reaction of defaults creates
an amplification mechanism in the default frequency. If we compare them with our
results for the social planner, we still find some amplification in the default frequency
12As mentioned before, proportional costs of default do not allow to sustain high levels of debt
and high frequencies of default in equilibrium.
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(0.07 compared to 0.02 percent), because default triggers a chain reaction in default
by lowering the valuation of collateral of all agents in the economy. Decentralized
default amplifies this effect even more because the private cost of default is smaller
than the social cost of default.















































Figure 2.4: Default Event
Figure (2.4) shows the behavior of some key real aggregates under the decen-
tralized equilibrium and social planner’s problem. Each line represents the average
value of all default events in the simulation under each setting. Prior to default,
there is an increase in the ratio of debt-to-GDP, which triggers default due to a
combination of high debt and a low endowment shock. This is also shown in the
sharp fall in the figure labeled ’GDP’, which is consistent with a fall in the total
value of collateral. A default event leads to capital outflows and a real exchange rate
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depreciation, consistent with the transfer problem. Private borrowers who default
lose a fraction of their collateral and access to international capital markets, which
is shown as a reduction in consumption in the period when default takes place and
a lower possibility of consumption smoothing in the following periods.
2.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis






















Figure 2.5: Default Set for λ2 = 0.9λ1
In this section, we analyze the behavior of the default externality under al-
ternative calibrations. One of the key features of this model is to include a cost of
default in terms of the value of collateral seized by lenders. Therefore, we present
an analysis on different parametrizations of the value of λ1 and λ2. The first ex-
periment is to increase the size of the dead-weight cost of default, by creating a
wedge between λ1 and λ2 of 10 percent of the value of λ1. Intuitively, an increase
in the deadweight-loss reduces the amount of collateral repatriated by lenders so
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they would compensate it by charging a higher interest rate. An increase in the
cost of borrowing has a second order effect on increasing incentives to default and
on default spillover effects. However, it does have a first order spillover effect on
the interest rate faced by all agents to compensate for the dead-weight loss. Figure
(2.5) shows a very small effect on the default set, whereas Figure (2.6) shows a lower
price of debt to compensate for the larger dead-weight loss.























Figure 2.6: Price of Debt for λ2 = 0.9λ1
Figure (2.7) presents the results for a second experiment, where we consider
a higher value of λ1 = λ2 = 0.12. A higher level of enforcement increases the
cost of default for both decentralized borrowers and a constrained social planner,
so that they choose to default less often than under the benchmark scenario. This
is reflected in a shift in the default sets to the left, so that default is prefered only
under very high levels of debt and/or very low values of tradable endowment. In
terms of the default externality, the default distortion occurs under higher levels of
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Figure 2.7: Default Set for λ1 = λ2 = 0.12
debt and/or lower levels of tradable endowment, so that the default penalty is used
less frequently.
There are several other parameters that are relevant in the magnitude of the
default externality. By looking at the Euler conditions in the decentralized equi-
librium and the social planner’s problem, (2.16) and (2.29), the key parameters
affecting the size of the default spillover effect are the ones that affect ∂ŷ/∂p ∂p/∂d.
The first term measures the impact of a real exchange rate depreciation on the in-
centives to default. The second one is the impact of an increase in individual debt
on the exchange rate.
There are three key parameters affecting the size of the spillover effect: the
elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods, 1/(1 + η), the
weight of non-tradable consumption in the consumption aggregator, 1− ω and the
discount factor, β. Our results show that the default externality is qualitatively un-
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Figure 2.8: Default Set for 1/(1 + η) = 0.4
changed under the alternative scenarios, where internalizing the effect of default on
the valuation of collateral leads to lower default incentives under the social planner’s
equilibrium.
The elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods, 1/(1+
η), plays a key role in determining the size of the real depreciation when default
takes place. Figure (2.8) shows the results for an elasticity of substitution of 0.4,
on the lower end of the estimates in Bianchi (2011), and Figure (2.9) for a higher
elasticity of substitution of 1.25, as in Benigno et al (2010), where tradable and
non-tradable goods are gross substitutes. A lower elasticity increases the level of
complementarity in the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods. Therefore,
a reduction in tradable consumption due to the inability of debt rollover sharply
reduces the demand for non-tradable goods as well, leading to a larger real exchange
rate depreciation. Therefore, the size of the default externality increases as tradable
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Figure 2.9: Default Set for 1/(1 + η) = 1.2
and non-tradable consumption become closer complements, which occurs at lower
values of the elasticity of substitution.
From a positive perspective, the size of the elasticity of substitution affects
the relative cost of repayment. In bad states, repayment becomes more costly, as
it implies a sharper fall in tradable consumption, so that default is preferred in a
larger set of states. This leads to larger incentives to default under a lower elasticity
of substitution, which is shown by comparing the default thresholds for the social
planner, depicted by the blue lines in Figures (2.8) and (2.9).
Similarly, a higher weight of tradable collateral, ω, increases the size of the
default externality, as it directly affects the incidence of a real exchange rate depre-
ciation. When default takes place, supply of tradable goods to domestic agents after
collateral repatriation falls. Figure (2.10) shows the size of the default externality
for an alternative scenario with a value of ω = 0.5. A higher weight of tradable col-
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Figure 2.10: Default Set for ω = 0.5
lateral sharply reduces the relative price of non-tradable goods, which results in a
larger amplification mechanism through the default spillover effect. From a positive
perspective, a higher weight on tradable consumption increases the cost of repay-
ment in bad states, so that agents default more often, widening the set of states
where default takes place.
Another key parameter is the relative size of non-tradable and tradable col-
lateral, yN , as it is only the fraction of non-tradable collateral which is affected by
changes in valuation through the real exchange rate depreciation.13 We repeat the
numerical exercise by reducing the size of non-tradable endowment in the composition of
collateral to half.14Figure (2.11) shows the reduction in the size of the default exter-
13Similar to the result obtained in Uribe (2006), if there is only tradable collateral, the pecuniary
externality disappears. If only tradable goods can be used as collateral, there is no valuation
effect on the default incentives and the financial contract faced by borrowers, so the decentralized
equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
14We change the value of yN so that the steady state value of total endowment remains the
same, but with a lower ratio of yN to y.
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Figure 2.11: Default Set for yN = 0.5
nality for a lower share of non-tradable collateral in the total composition. A lower
share of non-tradable collateral decreases the magnitude of the default externality,
as the real exchange rate depreciation has a smaller impact on the total value of
collateral, reducing the spillover effects on incentives to default. The last alterna-
tive scenario considers a lower discount factor, β. On one hand, agents want to
borrow more due to the impatience factor. However, on the other hand, higher debt
increases incentives to default, which amplify the default spillover effect. Figure
(2.12) shows the size of default externality with a lower value of β = 0.9. The im-
patience effect dominates so that agents choose to default in a smaller set of states
and face a smaller default externality. By comparing the default decisions of private
borrowers and the social planner, we observe a smaller default externality.
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Figure 2.12: Default Set for β = 0.9
2.3.4 Default Penalty
We solve numerically for the default penalty in the infinite horizon model. The
default penalty is the additional cost paid by individual defaulters that is propor-
tional to the value of their own collateral. Figure (2.13) depicts the optimal default
penalty for each state, where only the states with a distortion in default incentives
show a positive default penalty value.15The x-axis shows different values of initial
net assets, whereas each line corresponds to a different value of the tradable income
shock. As previously mentioned, the distortion in default incentives occur in the
middle range of debt values. Under high levels of debt, both the social planner and
private individuals choose to repay, whereas under low levels of debt both choose to
default.
15We could impose a positive penalty value on those states where both private agents and the
social planner would choose to repay but it has no effect on the final outcome.
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Figure 2.13: Optimal Policy
On those states where a default penalty is needed to correct the externality,
a higher endowment shock reduces the optimal value of the default penalty, as the
cost of defaulting is increasing in tradable endowment. On the debt dimension,
higher levels of debt require a higher tax to increase the cost of default and reduce
incentives to default, as the size of the externality is increasing in debt.
Note that in order to correct default incentives, we could also use a policy
instrument that reduces the marginal benefit of defaulting. Policy measures such
as credit refinancing could also correct the externality by increasing the marginal
benefit of repayment relative to defaulting. Another policy consistent with correct-
ing the distortion due to default spillover effects is the introduction of capital flow
subsidies as in Wright (2006).
Let us compare this result with models with endogenous borrowing constraints
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but no default. In that case, the optimal policy measure is to impose a tax in the
states where the constraint is not binding to prevent individual borrowers from tak-
ing excessive levels of debt, which would tighten the constraint through its effect on
collateral prices. In periods where borrowers are already facing a binding constraint
the tax does not affect their debt decision. In contrast, in the model with distortions
in the default choice, the optimal policy instrument needs to address only the states
where default takes place. Private borrowers can now take higher levels of debt
than in models with no default, but at the expense of higher risk and lower price of
debt. Therefore, the optimal policy instrument affects a different subset of states,
at higher levels of debt than the ones implied by the binding borrowing constraint.
2.4 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the distortion in incentives to default on collateralized
debt due to the existence of a default spillover externality in a two-good endowment
small open economy. Individuals fail to internalize the effect of their default decision
on the exchange rate and through it on the incentives to default of other borrowers in
the economy. An individual defaulter generates an exchange rate depreciation and
capital outflows that reduce the value of non-tradable collateral and induces other
borrowers to default. Therefore, by taking prices as given, private borrowers default
more frequently and face a higher risk premium, which limits optimal borrowing
and consumption smoothing.
Enforcement of creditor rights should be strengthened in order to align default
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incentives of individual agents with the socially optimal, so that individual agents
default less often. This leads private borrowers to increase their borrowing capacity,
face lower costs of taking debt and engage in better consumption smoothing. In
addition, in aggregate terms, it also leads to a lower probability of default and a
lower frequency of sharp current account reversals and real depreciations.
The model uses a simplified way of modeling the costs of the default, which has
the benefit of making it easy in terms of tractability and implementation to illustrate
the interaction mechanism between default and the value of collateral. However, we
could extend these results to a model that considers a more realistic approach on the
punishment of the debt contract under default. Even though this paper is related
to private default, similar conditions to the ones for sovereign default in Arellano
(2008) and Mendoza and Yue (2012) can be applied for the costs of private debt
default in order to obtain a more realistic default frequency and level of debt.
A further analysis of the optimal policy measures should focus on a wider
variety of policies that affect the incentives to default in order to align the default
choice of private borrowers to the socially optimal. This work only considers a
default penalty that affects the cost of default, but other policy measures that
reduce the marginal benefit of default such as credit refinancing could also correct
the externality.
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Chapter 3: State Contingent Assets, Financial Crises and Pecuniary
Externalities in Models with Collateral Constraints
3.1 Introduction
There has been great interest in the benefits and policy implications of finan-
cial innovation as a possible source of insurance against the vulnerabilities faced by
emerging countries and the likelihood of financial crises and default episodes. Dif-
ferent types of state contingent financial instruments and their theoretical benefits
have been discussed in the literature, as a way to stabilize capital flows to emerging
market economies and to provide a better source of hedging against macroeconomic
risks.1
This work analyzes the implications of diversifying the external liability port-
folio of private agents by having access to financial instruments with state contingent
payments, in the spirit of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds and future con-
tracts. We focus on its effect in terms of risk sharing, the frequency of financial crises
and its amplification mechanism through the effect on the valuation of collateral for
1Shiller (1993) presents an analysis of the benefits of developing financial markets for bonds with
payments linked to the level of GDP as a way to hedge against macroeconomic risks in a closed
economy setup. For references in the open economy literature, Williamson (2005) analyzes the
benefits of having access to growth indexed bonds that could be traded in international financial
markets as a way to reduce the probability of sharp reversals in capital flows.
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other agents in the economy.
In an environment with a single bond with a fixed interest rate, private agents
have only one instrument to engage in risk sharing in two margins: inter-temporally
between current and future consumption and intra-temporally between consumption
in periods of high and low endowment. Higher debt allows for inter-temporal risk
sharing for agents with high impatience, but does not allow for risk sharing across
states. When there is additional access to a state contingent, private agents can
improve risk sharing. In an environment with i.i.d. shocks, they can engage in
full risk sharing across states by using the state contingent bond to perfectly hedge
against uncertainty in the income shock and use the regular bond to engage in inter-
temporal risk sharing. With persistent shocks, this result is relaxed, as it is only
possible to partially hedge against the income shock, so that agents find it optimal
to accumulate precautionary savings, but in a smaller magnitude compared to the
case with bonds only.
In terms of the frequency of financial crises, access to state contingent debt
lowers the likelihood of default and financial crises, as repayment becomes less costly
in bad states. When a country faces a bad shock, a GDP-linked bond reduces the
amount of resources needed for debt rollover. As financial crises are related to
high levels of debt, there is a lower probability of crisis and smoother drops in
consumption. Lower frequency of financial crises benefits the borrower because
crises are extremely costly in terms of the reduction in output and consumption and
loss of access to financial markets.2 On the lender’s side, lower frequency of crises
2See Eichengreen (2004)
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is also optimal because debt crises are usually resolved by costly renegotiation or
enforcement process.
The main contribution of this work is to analyze the normative implications
of the interaction between the risk sharing properties of introducing contingent
repayment and the spillover effects of excessive debt to other agents in the economy.
State contingent debt service provides additional insurance through its effect on
the valuation of collateral, where lower interest payments in bad states loosens
the collateral constraint. This translates into smaller capital outflows, milder real
exchange rate depreciation and therefore a smaller impact of individual debt on the
valuation of collateral of other agents in the economy.
We present a qualitative analysis of the effects of having access to state contin-
gent instruments in a two-good endowment small open economy with limited access
to international financial markets. In an environment with i.i.d. shocks, agents can
fully insure against income shocks by using the state contingent asset and borrow up
to the collateral constraint using the non-state contingent bond to increase current
consumption. There is no additional spillover effect, as it is optimal to borrow at
the binding collateral constraint due to the impatience factor.
However, if the tradable endowment shock is persistent, agents cannot fully
hedge against this shock. Each private borrower exchanges current tradable income
for its expected value at the previous period, which is positively correlated to the
actual shock but less volatile. Partial exposure to the endowment shock creates
a need for accumulating precautionary savings, but in a smaller magnitude than
in an environment with bonds only. A constrained social planner considers the
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spillover effect of diversifying the debt portfolio towards the state contingent bond,
as it provides additional insurance by relaxing the collateral constraint in bad states
without tightening them in good states. State contingent debt service reduces capital
outflows, dampens the real exchange depreciation and therefore reduces the size of
the spillover effect.
From a normative perspective, private agents do not internalize the insurance
properties of the state contingent instrument in terms of relaxing the collateral
constraint. Higher individual borrowing reduces the price of non-tradable collateral
and therefore tightens the collateral constraint of other agents. A private agent
would therefore accumulate less precautionary savings than a constrained social
planner. Compared to the environment with bonds only, partial insurance through
the state contingent asset dampens the size of the pecuniary externality.
We also present a quantitative analysis of the benefits of having access to fi-
nancial instruments with state contingent interest payments and its effect on risk
sharing, the frequency of financial crises and the reduction in the pecuniary ex-
ternality that arises through the valuation of collateral. We calculate the optimal
holdings of both types of assets by private agents and the frequency of financial
crises and compare them to the solution of a constrained social planner who does
internalize the effect of individual borrowing on prices. We calculate the size of the
spillover effects on other agents borrowing in an environment with access to non-
state contingent bonds only and in one where agents have access to both non-state
contingent and state contingent bonds.
Our quantitative results show that private agents take higher levels of total
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debt and face a lower frequency of financial crises when they have access to both state
contingent and non-state contingent bonds. Comparing the decentralized equilibria
with and without state contingent bonds shows that, consistent with the previously
mentioned argument in Borenzstein and Mauro (2004), more stable debt service
reduces the requirement for new borrowing in bad times, hence hitting the borrowing
constraint less often. Partial insurance through state contingent debt holdings lowers
the need for precautionary savings.3
By comparing the size of the spillover effects on the valuation of collateral,
we find that the difference in the distribution of debt and the frequency of financial
crises between the decentralized equilibrium and the constrained social planner’s
problem is smaller in an environment with pro-cyclical debt service.4This is related
to the milder incidence of exchange rate depreciations on the collateral constraint
in bad states.
Related Literature. This work is related to the literature on the effects of
having access to indexed bonds. Among models of the benefits of indexed bonds,
Durdu (2009) studies the effect of indexing debt to GDP and solves for the optimal
degree of indexation, as there is a trade-off between income fluctuations and interest
rate fluctuations. We extend this model to consider the effect of pecuniary external-
ities in this environment with endogenous collateral constraints, where a mismatch
3Caballero and Panageas (2008) show that having access to future contracts lowers the size of
precautionary savings by roughly 10 percent of GDP.
4Given the presence of financial frictions, as mentioned in Korinek (2010), even a complete
set of state contingent bonds would not help to overcome the collateral constraint and achieve a
socially optimal outcome. However, there might be certain types of instruments that reduce the
likelihood of hitting the collateral constraint, and are able to get a smaller distortion in the debt
choice compared to the one of a credit constrained social planner.
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in the valuation of total income and debt denominated in tradable goods creates an
additional channel that amplifies the cost and frequency of financial crises.
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) present a detailed study on the benefits of
indexed bonds and a discussion on the concerns around choosing the optimal variable
for indexing debt, as well as the implications of developing markets for liquid trade
of this type of instrument. Among the advantages of GDP-indexed bonds is that
it reduces the volatility of the debt-to-GDP ratio and hence reduces the likelihood
of financial crises. During a period of low GDP, debt repayments fall and a lower
value of debt is required to rollover previously contracted debt. As financial crises
are related to high levels of debt, this financial instrument lowers the probability of
crises and reduces the amplification effect on consumption, the real exchange rate
depreciation and the reversal in capital flows.
On the theoretical side, this work is related to models of incomplete markets
and limited enforcement, such as Kehoe and Perri (2002), where agents have access
to a full set of state contingent assets. However, due to the existence of an enforce-
ment constraint, where borrowing is limited to prevent default, agents are not able
to engage in full risk sharing. This work shows a similar model where the collateral
constraint is similar to the enforcement constraint in Kehoe and Perri (2002), but
agents only have access to one additional asset that has a state contingent interest
payment, which is closer in nature to a GDP-linked bond. Bai and Zhang (2010)
present a model of limited enforcement and limited spanning for a production econ-
omy, where the financial constraint comes from an incentive compatibility constraint
that ensures repayment even under the worst case scenario, and agents have access
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to non-state contingent bonds only. This work uses a similar setup in an endowment
economy, expands it to the two-good case and analyzes the features of the model
when a wider range of state contingent bonds is available.
A closely related strand of the literature analyzes the quantitative implica-
tions of contingent financial instruments as a substitute to large accumulation of
precautionary savings. Caballero and Panageas (2008) present a quantitative model
to analyze the gains of using contingent financial instruments to reduce the prob-
ability of sudden stops. They present a model with a borrowing constraint with
limited pledgeability of future income to finance current account deficits. Using
VIX futures as hedging instruments, a country can reduce the need for precaution-
ary savings and have large transitional gains. A similar quantitative analysis is
presented in Borenzstein et al (2009), where borrowers use precautionary savings
jointly with commodity futures as contingent hedging instruments for commodity
exporter countries and calculate the welfare gains.
This work is also related to models where a pecuniary externality arises through
the effect of valuation of collateral in credit constraints. Bianchi (2011) and Korinek
(2010) analyze the presence of an externality effect and the over-borrowing result
associated with it. By ignoring the effect of their debt choice on relative prices and
on the tightness of the collateral constraint of other agents, each private borrower
takes excessive debt compared to the debt level of a constrained social planner.
Thus, decentralized agents face a higher probability of financial crises, described as
an episode of large current account reversals.
The optimal policy to correct this externality is the use of Pigouvian taxes
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to achieve the second best solution, given by the outcome of the constrained social
planner’s problem. We show that having access to hedging instruments with state
contingent interest payments reduce the size of the externality in this type of models,
as they provide partial hedging against shocks, reducing the need for precautionary
savings and have an asymmetric effect on the collateral constraint, by loosening it
in bad states.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the
model. Section 3 presents the analytical results on the benefits of having access to
contingent financial instruments with pro-cyclical debt service. Section 4 presents
an analysis of the quantitative results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model
We present an infinite horizon model of a continuum of domestic private agents
who have limited access to international capital markets from a large pool of risk
neutral lenders. Domestic agents’ preferences are defined on the consumption of a
composite good, which depend on the consumption of tradable and non-tradable
goods. They can borrow using two types of financial instruments: a non-state
contingent bond, with a fixed interest payment, and a bond with state contingent
interest rate payments. International borrowing is subject to limited enforcement,




We make reference to the two-good model presented in Mendoza (2006) of
a small open economy inhabited by a continuum of identical private agents that







−µ + (1− a)(cNt )−µ
]− 1
µ (3.1)
where a is the CES weighting factor for tradable goods (0 ≤ a ≤ 1) and 1
1+µ
is the
elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods (µ ≥ −1).








where γ is the relative risk aversion coefficient.
Agents have access to two types of financial instruments that are traded in in-
ternational capital markets: a non-state contingent bond (bt+1), with a gross interest
rate of R, and a state contingent financial instrument (b̂t+1), where the repayment
of the principal is fixed but the interest rate payment (Ryt ) is contingent on the
realization of the endowment shock. Agents choose consumption of tradable (cTt )
and non-tradable goods (cNt ) and foreign asset holdings (bt+1 and b̂t+1).
There is a large pool of risk neutral international lenders, where the partic-
ipation constraint that allows for both types of contracts in equilibrium is given
by:
EtRyt+1 = R (3.3)
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3.2.2 Collateral Constraint
Due to imperfect enforceability of contracts, agents face a borrowing constraint
in international credit markets. We can think of this as the requirement of collateral
in order to obtain credit, based on the value of the current income of domestic agents.
Only collateralized debt is offered by international creditors up to a fraction κ of the
domestic agent’s current income. A key feature in order to obtain an inefficiency
in this type of models is the effect of relative prices on the collateral constraint.
The use of non-tradable goods as collateral is related to the empirical evidence on
credit booms in the non-tradable sector with external credit, as shown in Tornell
and Westermann (2005). The other important feature is that collateral is calculated
in terms of current income, which is consistent with the evidence found in Japelli
(1990) where current income is a key factor affecting the probability of having access
to credit markets.
The collateral constraint is given by:5
bt+1 + b̂t+1 ≥ −κ(yTt + pNt yN) (3.4)
which is more binding than the natural debt limit. yTt is the tradable endowment
shock, yN is non-tradable endowment and pt is the relative price of non-tradable
goods, which is also an indicator of the inverse of the real exchange rate.
In comparison to a model with no borrowing constraints, domestic agents
reduce consumption and borrowing and accumulate precautionary savings to hedge
5Notice that positive values of non-state contingent and state contingent assets can also be used
as collateral. Going long on one asset and short on the other one by the same amount does not
affect the collateral constraint.
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against negative shocks that make the borrowing constraint binding.
3.2.3 Model Equilibrium
We solve for the allocations in the constrained social planner’s problem and
compare them to the ones in the competitive equilibrium in order to measure the
size of the pecuniary externality, the price distortion, and the frequency of financial
crises.
3.2.3.1 Competitive Equilibrium
Each private agent in the domestic economy solves the following recursive
problem:













b′ + b̂′ + cT + pNcN = yT + bR + b̂Ry + pNyN (3.6)
b′ + b̂′ ≥ −κ[yT + pNyN ] (3.7)
where the relative price of non-tradable goods, pN = pN(b, b̂, yT ), is a function of
aggregate borrowing and the tradable endowment shock (yT ).
Definition 4 The recursive competitive equilibrium is defined by the policy func-
tions {cT (b, b̂, yT ), cN(b, b̂, yT ), b′(b, b̂, yT ), b̂′(b, b̂, yT )}, prices {pN(b, b̂, yT )} such that:
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1. Borrowers: Taking pN(b, b̂, yT ) as given, each agent solves the borrower’s prob-
lem to obtain the policy functions.
2. Market clearing: Markets for tradable and non-tradable goods clear:
cN = yN (3.8)
cT (b, b̂, yT ) + b′(b, b̂, yT ) + b̂′(b, b̂, yT ) = yT + bR + b̂Ry (3.9)
3.2.3.2 Constrained Social Planner Solution
Definition 5 The constrained social planner’s equilibrium is defined by policy func-
tions {cT (b, b̂, yT ), cN(b, b̂, yT ), b′(b, b̂, yT ), b̂′(b, b̂, yT )} that solve:













cT = yT − b′ − b̂′ + bR + b̂Ry (3.11)
cN = yN (3.12)








In this section, we present a qualitative analysis of the implications of state
contingent assets in terms of risk sharing and the size of the pecuniary externality.
With pro-cyclical interest payments, where borrowers pay a higher interest rate in
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good states and lower interest rate in bad ones, state contingent assets allow bor-
rowers to partially hedge against the borrowing constraint in bad states, which are
exactly the states where they need to borrow more in order to smooth consumption.
By being less credit constrained, collateral prices drop less than in the case with only
non-state contingent bonds and, therefore, the amplification mechanism created by
the pecuniary externality is dampened.
3.3.1 Two bonds with i.i.d. tradable income shocks
A first step is to analyze an environment with i.i.d. shocks, where state con-
tingent interest payments can be used to offset the fluctuations in tradable income.
Debt with pro-cyclical interest payments allows agents to improve the transfer of
resources from periods of high GDP to periods of low GDP, hence smoothing con-
sumption across states.
When the tradable income shock is i.i.d., agents can perfectly hedge against
uncertainty in the income shock across states with state contingent debt and use
the non-state contingent bond to engage in risk sharing between periods.6
Proposition 2 If the tradable income shock is i.i.d., state contingent bonds are
used to perfectly hedge against uncertainty in the income shock, whereas the non-
state contingent bond is used for inter-temporal risk sharing. If βR < 1, the optimal
choice for the non-state contingent bond is given by the binding collateral constraint:
b′ = −κ[yT + pNyN ]− b̂ (3.14)
6The derivation is presented in Appendix B.1.
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Proof. For any two realizations of the tradable endowment shock, y and y′, it is
possible to choose a level of the state contingent debt, b̂, so that consumption is the
same across states.
c(y) = y − b′ − b̂′ + bR + b̂Ry
c(y′) = y′ − b′ − b̂′ + bR + b̂Ry′





where α is the degree of indexation of the interest rate payment for state contingent
debt.7
If βR < 1, it is optimal to borrow up to the binding borrowing constraint.
The constrained social planner and decentralized agents choose the same amount of
debt:
b′ = −κ[yT + pNyN ]− b̂
Let us analyze the case of a −ε shock to tradable endowment in period 0. Agents
borrow up to the collateral constraint:










c0 = ε(1− κ)− κpN(ε)yN (3.17)
c1 = Rκ[ε+ p
N(ε)yN ] (3.18)
and ct = 0 for t ≥ 2.

















Figure 3.1: Optimal insurance across states using state contingent assets
Figure (3.1) shows the ability to smooth consumption across different states
for an i.i.d. tradable endowment shock. The x-axis represents different values of
the tradable endowment shock, centered at zero. Agents would optimally choose to
trade the amount of the state contingent asset that allows for perfect hedging. The
optimal amount of b̂ is such that, every period, agents would trade their income
realization, yt, for a fixed income, Et−1[yt] = E[yt], and achieve full consumption
smoothing across states, shown by the constant consumption value at c∗. In order
to achieve this result, agents need to borrow b̂ = − 1
α
, so that the net flow in state
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contingent debt, Ryt b̂t − b̂t+1, perfectly offsets the effect of the tradable shock. If
agents choose a lower amount of state contingent assets, like for example b̂ = − 1
2α
,
they would not be able to completely insure against the tradable income shock and
would face a positive correlation between the shock and tradable consumption. This
results in a positively correlated tradable consumption path, c′.
In terms of the effect on the pecuniary externality, both decentralized bor-
rowers and a constrained social planner would find it optimal to borrow up to the
binding collateral constraint, so that there is no pecuniary externality.8
3.3.2 Model with two bonds and persistent shocks
When shocks are persistent, state contingent debt provides partial hedging
against income shocks across states, even though it is not possible to achieve full
risk sharing. Partial exposure to tradable income requires agents to accumulate
some precautionary savings, which makes it suboptimal to borrow up to the binding
collateral constraint. State contingent debt provides two benefits: it provides partial
hedging to reduce consumption fluctuations and reduces the tightness of collateral
constraints in bad states.
From a normative perspective, we find that a constrained social planner ac-
cumulates more precautionary savings (or equivalently takes lower debt) as she
internalizes that higher debt leads to a fall in the value of collateral through its ef-
fect on the real exchange rate, making other agents more financially constrained as
8A pecuniary externality would arise in a special case where the coefficient of the equilibrium
path is equal to one, so that the equilibrium oscillates between the constrained and unconstrained
cases.
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well, consistent with the results in an environment with bonds only. The pecuniary
externality arises because agents fail to internalize the effect of their decisions in
the valuation of collateral, and hence the whole economy faces financial crises more
frequently.
However, in terms of the composition of total debt, a constrained social plan-
ner also internalizes that state contingent debt allows for partial hedging against the
tightening of the collateral constraint, as it dampens the exchange rate depreciation
in bad states. Lower interest payments allow for more debt rollover, which reduces
the fall in tradable consumption and hence reduces the size of the real deprecia-
tion. This leads to a higher level of state contingent debt relative to the private
equilibrium.
Let us analyze why the collateral constraint does not allow for perfect hedging
against persistent tradable income shocks. We first present graphically the case
where there is no borrowing constraint and no impatience factor, βR = 1, and show
that agents can perfectly hedge against risk across states and time. We present the
results for the effect of a one time −ε shock on tradable endowment in period 0 on
consumption and debt.
Tradable endowment follows an AR(1) process:
yt = ρyt−1 + εt (3.21)
For a one time shock in period 0, this becomes:
yt = −ρtε (3.22)
Given that βR = 1, the inter-temporal Euler equation establishes that agents would
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Figure 3.2: Effect of -ε shock on tradable endowment
optimally choose to engage in full consumption smoothing and accumulate debt to









Figure (3.2) shows the time path for tradable endowment (y), tradable consumption
(c) and assets (b) in the case with no borrowing constraint. Agents can optimally
choose to accumulate debt until they get a positive endowment shock that allows
them to pay it back.
Let us compare this result to the case with the borrowing constraint and
βR < 1. The following proposition shows that it is not possible to achieve full risk
sharing as in the i.i.d. case.
Proposition 3 In an environment with persistent tradable endowment shocks, if
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βR < 1, agents borrow less than the amount given by the collateral constraint,
−κ[yT + pNyN ].
Proof. By contradiction, let us assume that agents borrow up to the collateral
constraint.




For a one time −ε shock in period 0, this becomes:




Tradable consumption must satisfy the budget constraint:
ct = −(1 + κ)ρtε+Rκερt−1 (3.27)


















Therefore, bt+1 is less than the value given by the collateral constraint.
3.3.2.1 Decentralized Equilibrium
Optimal bond holdings in the decentralized equilibrium are given by:
U1(ct) = βREt {U1(ct+1)}+ ξt (3.30)




t ) and ξt is the shadow price of the collateral constraint. Compared
to a standard model with no financial frictions, the Euler equation shows that agents
borrow less if they face a borrowing constraint, given by the term ξt.
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The inter-temporal Euler equation for the bond with state contingent interest






= βREt{U1(ct+1)}+ βcov(Ryt+1, U1(ct+1)) + ξt (3.31)
Pro-cyclical interest payments reduce the need to accumulate precautionary sav-
ings. There is a negative covariance between the marginal utility of consumption of
tradable goods and the interest rate, so that debt provides partial hedging against
income fluctuations. Therefore, private agents borrow more or, equivalently, accu-
mulate less precautionary savings. By partially hedging against the tradable income
shock, agents do not need to borrow as much in bad states, so that they hit the
collateral constraint less frequently, which allows for better consumption smoothing
and risk transfer. This is consistent with the results in Caballero and Panageas and
the idea behind the rationality of introducing GDP indexed bonds to stabilize the
debt service ratio in Borensztein and Mauro (2004).
Compared to the case with i.i.d. shocks, private agents are now unable to
engage in perfect risk sharing across states because of the collateral constraint.
There is a trade-off between the two margins: across states and across time, where
higher risk sharing across states tightens the collateral constraint, so that there
is less space for risk sharing across time using the non-state contingent bond. In
equilibrium, the marginal benefit of increasing risk sharing across time, given by the
right hand side of equation (3.30) must be equal to the marginal benefit of increasing
risk sharing across states, given by the right hand side of equation (3.31).
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If agents choose to borrow with bonds only (b̂t = 0), cov(R
y, U1(ct+1)) < 0.
By increasing the holdings of debt in the state contingent asset, agents are able to
optimally eliminate the correlation between income fluctuations, and hence interest
rate fluctuations, with the marginal utility of consumption. This result is similar to
the argument in Figure (3.1), even though private agents can only achieve partial
consumption smoothing. The analytical result is obtained by combining equations
(3.30) and (3.31):
cov(Ryt+1, U1(ct+1)) = 0 (3.32)
3.3.2.2 Constrained social planner
Consider now a benevolent social planner who faces the same financial con-
tracts as the private borrowers, but does internalize the spillover effects of agents’
debt on collateral prices. As a result, we can show that the decentralized equilib-
rium is not constrained Pareto optimal, but the magnitude of the spillover effect is
dampened when there is access to state contingent bonds.












By comparing equations (3.30) and (3.33), a constrained social planner chooses
lower debt, −bt+1 − b̂t+1, or equivalently, accumulates more precautionary savings
to insure against the fact that a higher level of debt lowers the price of non-tradable
collateral, and therefore, further tightens the borrowing constraint.
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By comparing equations (3.33) and (3.34), we get that:





yN) = 0 (3.35)
Similar to the decentralized equilibrium, increasing state contingent debt provides
partial hedging against income fluctuations, given by the first term in equation
(3.35). In addition, it also provides partial hedging against the collateral constraint,
by making it less tight in bad states. Comparing equations (3.32) and (3.35), we
can show that private agents take lower state contingent debt than the constrained
social planner, −b̂CEt+1 < −b̂SPt+1.
The intuition behind this result is that the constrained social planner does
internalize the fact that taking more state contingent debt today gives the additional
benefit of relaxing the collateral constraint tomorrow through the lower interest rate
payments which lead to a lower drop in the price of non-tradable goods. Therefore,
the state contingent asset has two benefits: it gives partial insurance across states by
reducing consumption fluctuations and it affects insurance across time by reducing
the tightness of collateral constraints in bad times.
We analyze the size of the pecuniary externality on total debt holdings for a
private agent who is currently unconstrained (ξt = 0) and compare it to the case
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with bonds only. The pecuniary externality is smaller because state contingent
debt provides partial hedging against bad shocks and against hitting the collateral
constraint in bad times, so that the amplification mechanism given by the spillover
effects of debt through collateral prices is dampened. By comparing equations (3.30)








This result is consistent with the result in Bianchi (2011) and Korinek (2010) that
a constrained social planner that internalizes the effect of debt on relative prices
chooses lower levels of debt than decentralized private borrowers.
By comparing the two Euler equations for state contingent debt, we find that
the pecuniary externality term for a borrower that is currently unconstrained (ξt =












Using the result in equation (3.35), agents who have access to borrowing with










The pecuniary externality is smaller because agents are allowed to borrow more
in bad states of the economy, which is precisely when they need to borrow more
to smooth consumption at the expense of facing tighter constraints in good states,
where they do not need to borrow as much.
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Given that agents can borrow more in bad states of nature, they face a milder
drop in relative prices compared to the case where there is only access to non-state
contingent bonds. The smaller drop in relative prices and smaller amplification
mechanism in the tightening of the collateral constraint reduces the size of the
pecuniary externality. This results in lower need for precautionary savings and the
constraint is binding in a lower frequency of states as well.
3.4 Quantitative Results
This section presents the solution to the infinite horizon problem using value
function iteration. We analyze the distribution of debt levels, the frequency of
financial crises and the size of the pecuniary externality in an environment with
access to non-state and state contingent bonds. The results are consistent with the
qualitative results in the previous section.
In order to analyze the quantitative properties of the model, we obtain the
policy rules, the distribution of debt levels, the size of the pecuniary externality and
the price of non-tradable goods under each state. Then, we simulate the model for
10,000 periods, where each period represents a year, in order to get the distribution
of real variables and the frequency of financial crises.
3.4.1 Parameter Values
The values of the parameters are shown in Table (3.1). We use the parameter
values for the quantitative exercise in Bianchi (2011), which is calibrated to the
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
a 0.31 yN 1
β 0.945 κ 0.32
γ 2 α 0.2
µ −0.205 R 1.045
Table 3.1: Parameter Values
economy of Argentina at an annual frequency. For the endowment shock process,
we match a standard deviation of 0.059 and an autocorrelation value of 0.54. We
use the discretization method proposed by Tauchen (1987) to approximate the first
order autocorrelation process with a five grid point first-order Markov process.
3.4.2 Policy functions
























Figure 3.3: Social Planner: Policy Functions for NFA
Figure (3.3) shows the policy functions for net foreign assets (NFA, defined
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as b′ + b̂′), chosen by a social planner who faces a tradable endowment shock that
is one standard deviation below the mean, with and without access to contingent
bonds. The line labeled ’NSC bond’ shows the total assetposition chosen by a
constrained social planner with access to non-state contingent bonds only and the
line labeled ’Contingent Borrowing’ is the total asset position when they have access
to both non-state contingent and state contingent intrsuments. Pro-cyclical interest
payments provide partial hedging against the shock and allows the social planner
to borrow more in states with a low endowment shock, as they need to accumulate
lower precautionary savings.
The largest gain in terms of the ability to borrow in bad states is seen in
periods where the agent is already highly indebted, due to the insurance benefit of
state contingent debt which allows to relax the binding collateral constraint in bad
states. A smaller drop in consumption of tradable goods dampens the effect of the
real exchange rate depreciation on the valuation of collateral and therefore on the
tightness of the collateral constraint.
Now, let us compare the optimal debt choice in an environment with access
to state contingent repayment assets only. Figure (3.4) presents the results for an
environment with state contingent assets only, labeled ’SC only’, and both typesof
assets, labeled ’NSC+SC’. State contingent repayment allows for better insurance
against shocks to the tradable endowment, reducing the volatility of net income. If
all debt has state contingent repayment, then borrowers need to repay less in bad
states of nature, making the constraint less tight than if total debt has a combination
of state contingent and non-state contingent repayment. As shown by the policy
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Figure 3.4: Policy Functions for NFA with and without access to non-state contingent
bonds
functions, this effect is especially important in intermediate levels of debt, where
the pecuniary externality is the largest.
Figure (3.5) presents the policy functions for NFA in an environment with
access to both types of bonds. (SP) represents the policy function for a constrained
social planner, whereas (CE) represents the policy function for decentralized agents
who do not internalize the effect of their decisions on the exchange rate. In this
scenario, state contingent debt provides partial hedging against income fluctuations,
but the social planner additionally internalizes that it also provides insurance against
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Figure 3.5: Two Bonds: Policy Functions for NFA
hitting the collateral constraint by dampening the effect of individual debt on the
real exchange rate.
The difference between the two policy functions is given by internalizing the
effect of the debt choice on the valuation of collateral. Similar to the benchmark
case with bonds only, decentralized agents do not consider that higher levels of debt
further tightens the constraint through a sharp drop on the valuation of collateral.
Highly leveraged agents are limited by the borrowing constraint, so they must lower
borrowing in bad states of nature. A fall in consumption translates into a real
exchange rate depreciation due to capital outflows that occur during sudden stop
episodes.
However, with contingent assets, agents face the binding borrowing constraint
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less often, as the value of repayment is much lower in bad states of nature. Given
that agents do not need to reduce their tradable consumption as much, the effect of
the current account reversal on the exchange rate is dampened. Decentralized agents
face a smaller real exchange rate depreciation and a smaller drop in the nominal
value of collateral. Therefore, the collateral constraint allows for higher amounts of
debt by relaxing the borrowing constraint in low states, which are exactly the ones
where agents want to borrow more.
3.4.3 Distribution of NFA
We compute the stationary distribution of net foreign asset holdings for the
decentralized equilibrium with non-state contingent bonds, the constrained efficient
solution and the equilibrium with both types of bonds. The stationary distribution
of net foreign assets shows that there is a higher probability of reaching higher debt
levels under an equilibrium with a single non-state contingent bond than under the
constrained efficient case. This result is consistent with the policy functions, where
agents in the decentralized economy borrow more than the constrained efficient level
of debt.
Figure (3.6) shows the distribution of NFA for the constrained efficient case
(SP) in the top panel and for the decentralized equilibrium (CE) in the bottom
panel, with non-state contingent bonds only. The average debt in terms of tradable
income is 87 percent (27,5 percent of GDP) for the constrained efficient case, while
the average debt is 90 percent (28,6 percent of GDP) for the decentralized economy.
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Moreover, 49 percent of the highest debt levels for the decentralized equilibrium are
not achieved under the constrained efficient equilibrium.






Non−State Contingent Bond: NFA distribution
 
 










Figure 3.6: NFA distribution with Non-State Contingent Bonds
Figure (3.7) shows the distribution of NFA for the constrained efficient case
(SP) and for the decentralized equilibrium (CE) in an environment with the two
types of bonds. The results are consistent with the qualitative analysis in that there
is a smaller difference in the distribution of total debt, and hence a smaller pecuniary
externality. Also, state contingent debt reduces the need for precautionary savings
and increases the average debt level in both cases. The average debt level under
the decentralized equilibrium rises to 90,2 percent of tradable income (28,7 percent
of GDP), whereas a constrained social planner who internalizes the effect of higher
debt on the valuation of collateral has an average debt level of 88 percent of tradable
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Shock Contingent Asset: NFA distribution
 
 











Figure 3.7: NFA distribution with Contingent Instruments
income (27,7 percent of GDP).
If we compare these results with an environment with access to state contin-
gent repayment only, shown in Figure (3.8), we find that 44,9 percent of the highest
debt levels for the decentralized equilibrium are not achieved under the constrained
efficient equilibrium, compared to 46,5 percent in the case with access to both types
of assets. This result shows that there is a smaller pecuniary externality in an
environment where agents have access only to bonds with state contingent repay-
ment. The intuition behind this result is that, with state contingent repayment
only, the pecuniary externality only affects the total level of debt, while benefiting
from the insurance properties of the state contingent repayment. In contrast, in an
environment with both types of bonds, the pecuniary externality affects the total
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Figure 3.8: NFA distribution with Contingent Instruments Only
amount and the composition of debt, creating a larger distortion from the second
best solution.
3.4.4 Crisis Probability
A financial crisis is defined in our setup as a state where the economy is con-
strained by the collateral requirement and where the current account suffers a rever-
sal with a magnitude larger than one standard deviation. There are two channels
that create a wedge between the frequency of financial crises under the constrained
social planner’s problem and the decentralized equilibrium. The first one is related
to the higher proportion of state contingent debt chosen by a constrained social
planner. Higher state contingent debt provides insurance by reducing the tightness
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of the collateral constraint in bad times so that binding collateral constraints are less
frequent. The second channel is related to the fact that the social planner chooses
a lower amount of total debt, as they internalize that higher debt tightens the col-
lateral constraint through the effect on the valuation of collateral. Lower borrowing
translates into lower probability of facing a binding collateral constraint as well.
In the environment with bonds only, the probability of a financial crisis is 4,6
percent, compared to 0,8 percent for the constrained social planner. However, if
agents have access to the two types of bonds, the probability of a financial crisis in
the decentralized equilibrium falls to 4,2 percent.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the effect of using alternative hedging instruments
with contingent interest payments on risk sharing, the probability of a financial crisis
and the size of the price externality in a two-good endowment economy subject to
an endogenous collateral constraint.
Access to state contingent bonds allows agents to obtain partial hedging against
income fluctuations and therefore engage in better consumption smoothing. In addi-
tion, state contingent debt creates an asymmetric effect on the collateral constraint,
where pro-cyclical interest payments relaxes the collateral constraint in bad states,
when agents need to borrow more, at the cost of tightening it in good states, when
they do not need to borrow as much. Lower volatility of consumption dampens the
fall in the price of non-tradable collateral in bad states, as agents would be facing
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a less tight collateral constraint and would not need to reduce their borrowing and
consumption as much.
Having access to state contingent financial instruments reduce the probability
of experiencing a financial crisis and the dampens the amplification effect created by
the spillover effect of individual debt on the valuation of collateral of other agents.
However, it is not possible to fully correct the pecuniary externality. As shown in
Bianchi (2011) and Korinek (2010), the use of a Pigouvian tax that depends on the
level of individual debt is able to align the private equilibrium to the one obtained
by a constrained social planner. The optimal tax level is higher in states of higher
debt levels, as there is a higher probability that the economy could face a binding
collateral constraint in future periods. A financial instrument that is only contingent
on the income shock does not allow to differentiate its interest payments between
agents with high and low leverage, who face different marginal benefits of hedging
against the income shock.
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Chapter A: Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Pecuniary externality, optimal default and debt choices in the
decentralized equilibrium and the social planner’s solution







A.1.1 Intertemporal Euler equations
A.1.1.1 Decentralized Equilibrium


























































































































A.1.2 Effect of individual debt on default incentives
A.1.2.1 Decentralized equilibrium



















































U1(ĉR)− (1− λ1)U1(ĉD) + λ1 ∂p̂∂ĉT y
NU1(ĉD)
(A.9)









A.2 Optimal default penalty
We solve for the competitive equilibrium conditions when the default penalty in-
strument is available. The problem of a representative private borrower under repayment
is the same, except for the new definition of welfare under the default state, vD, which
affects the default threshold, ŷ.










N = (1− λ1(1 + τ))(ŷ + pyN ) + T (A.12)

















U1(ĉR)− (1− λ1(1 + τ))U1(ĉD)
(A.14)
In order to align default incentives to the social planner’s equilibrium, τ must satisfy:
(1 + r)U1(ĉ
R)








U1(ĉR)− (1− λ1)U1(ĉD) + λ1 ∂p̂∂ĉT yNU1(ĉD)
(A.15)
A.3 Deadweight cost of default
This section shows that if there is no deadweight cost created by default, then it
leads to efficient debt and default decisions. We show it in a simple two period model,
where we impose that λ1 = λ2, which is the case where all seized assets under default are
transfered to the lender in terms of tradable goods.
A.3.1 Decentralized equilibrium
Debt follows the following optimality condition:















The default threshold is defined as:
U (ŷ − (1 + r1)d1, yN ) = U(ĉD,CET , ĉ
D,CE
N )






s.t. ĉD,CET + pĉ
D,CE
N = (1− λ1)(ŷ + p̂yN )
85








(ŷ + p̂yN )
and the default threshold condition is










(ŷ + p̂yN )
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Replacing the market clearing price in the default condition it becomes














(1 + r1)d1 = λ1(ŷ + p̂yN )
Plugging this result in the optimality condition, it simplifies to: CE
U1(c1) =








Optimal debt chosen by the social planner follows:




















The default threshold is given by:
log(ŷ − (1 + r1)d1) + log(yN ) = log
(













Plugging this result in the optimality condition, it simplifies to: SP:
U1(c1) =








Agents consume only tradable goods in the first period (to simplify the problem)
and tradable and non-tradable goods in the second period. The tradable endowment in
the second period can take 2 values: yL with probability π and yH with probability 1−π.
To analyze the size of the pecuniary externality in a model with exogenous default,
we must choose parameter values such that agents choose to repay in the high state (yH)
and default in the low state (yL).




yN ) < (1 + r)d




yN ) ≥ (1 + r)d
A.4.1 Decentralized equilibrium
Private agents choose debt to maximize expected utility:
U(y + d) + βπU(cLT2, c
L
N2) + β(1− π)U(cHT2, cHN2)
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subject to the budget constraints
cL2 + +p2c
L
N2 = (1− λ1)yL + (1− λ1)p2yN
cH2 + p2c
H
N2 = yH − (1 + r)d+ p2yN
and the interest rate schedule:




The optimal choice of debt satisfies:




Let us assume log-utility U(cT,cN ) = log(cT )+log(cN ) to simplify the problem. The
social planner chooses debt to maximize expected utility:
U(y + d) + βπU(cLT2, c
L
N2) + β(1− π)U(cHT2, cHN2)
subject to the resource constraints:









and the interest rate schedule:






The optimal level of debt satisfies:
U1(c1) = β
[







U1(c1) = β(1 + ρ)
1− π




Comparing the debt choice under the decentralized equilibrium and the socially efficient
level, we see that:
U1(c
SP






Increase in debt reduces p2. Given an exogenous default threshold, the probability of
default does not change. However, the relative price does affect the amont of resources
recovered by the lender under default, given by y
L+p2yN
d . Lower prices and higher debt
means that they get a lower amount of resources under the default scenario, so they charge
a higher interest rate schedule to compensate for this loss. As the interest rate schedule
in the social planner’s problem is steeper, the social planner chooses a lower level of debt.
A.5 Optimal Policy in the Two-Period Model
We introduce new tax on default (τ), which is an additional cost faced by borrowers
in case of default and is charged in terms of total income. The revenue is given back as a
lump sum transfer T .
Under this new setup, the new default threshold ŷ is given by
ŷ − (1 + r)d = (1− λ1 − τ)ŷ − (λ1 + τ)p̂yN + T̂ (A.16)
In equilibrium, T̂ = τ(ŷ + p̂yN ), and the default set becomes:
ŷ − (1 + r)d = (1− λ1)ŷ − λ1p̂yN (A.17)
which is consistent with the default threshold under the social planner’s problem. The
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(y + pyN )f(y2)dy2 = 1 + ρ (A.18)
The problem faced by each decentralized borrower is:
max
c1T,c1N,c2T,c2N,d












c1T + p1c1N = y1 + d+ p1yN
cR2T + p2c
R
2N = y2 − (1 + r)d+ p2yN
cD2T + p2c
D
2N = (1− λ1 − τ)y2 − (λ1 + τ)p2yN + T







(y + pyN )f(y2)dy2 = 1 + ρ
The intertemporal optimality condition for debt is:




























= 1 + ρ
The optimality condition becomes:
U1(y1 + d) =
β(1 + ρ)
∫ ȳ
ŷ U1(y2 − (1 + r)d)f(y2)dy2∫ ȳ




Plugging the value of the default threshold:
U1(y1 + d) =
β(1 + ρ)
∫ ȳ
ŷ U1(y2 − (1 + r)d)f(y2)dy2∫ ȳ
ŷ f(y2)dy2 −
[




Using the equilibrium value of T̂
U1(y1 + d) =
β(1 + ρ)
∫ ȳ
ŷ U1(y2 − (1 + r)d)f(y2)dy2∫ ȳ




In order to get the same allocations as in the social planner’s problem, we choose a tax
that makes this equation equivalent to the one in the social planner’s problem. From the












Comparing it to the social planner’s optimality condition to get the value of τ :
(λ1 − λ2)(ŷ + p̂yN )
λ1 + τ
=
(λ1 − λ2)(ŷ + p̂yN )(1 + λ1)
2λ1








A.6 Algorithm for the Numerical Solution
A.6.1 Social Planner’s Problem
1. Start with some guess for the price of bonds q0(d, y) = 11+ρ for all d and y.
2. Given the interest rate schedule, solve for the optimal consumption c(d, y), debt
holdings d′(d, y), and default set δ(d, y) using value function iteration. Iterate on
the value function until convengence is achieved.
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3. Using the default set and repayment set, compute the new price of bonds q1(d, y)
that satisfies the zero profit condition for the risk neutral lender and compare it
with the onee used in the previous iteration q0(d, y).If a convergence criterion is
met, max
∣∣q1(d, y)− q0(d, y)∣∣ < εr, go to the next step. If not, update the bond
price using a Gauss - Seidel algorithm and go back to the previous step.
A.6.2 Decentralized Equilibrium
1. Start with some guess for the relative price of non-tradable goods in each state
p0(D, y). An initial guess is the price obtained from the social planner’s problem.
2. Start with some guess for the price of bonds q0(d,D, y) = qSP (d, y) for all D from
the social planner’s problem.
3. Start with some guess for the law of motion of aggregate debt Γ0(D, y) = d′(d, y)
from the social planner’s problem.
4. Given the interest rate schedule, solve for the optimal consumption c(d,D, y), debt
holdings d′(d,D, y) and default set δ(d,D, y) using value function iteration. For
every iteration, update the law of motion for aggregate debt Γi(D, y) = d′i(D,D, y).
Iterate on the value function until convergence is achieved.
5. Using the default and repayment sets, compute the bond price q1(d,D, y) that
satisfies the zero profit condition for the risk neutral lender and compare it with
the one used in the previous iteration q0(d,D, y).If a convergence criterion is met,
max
∣∣q1(d,D, y)− q0(d,D, y)∣∣ < εr, go to the next step. If not, update the interest
rate schedule using a Gauss - Seidel algorithm and go back to the previous step.
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6. Using optimal debt holdings, compute the price of non- tradable goods p1(D, y)
and compare it with the previous guess p0(D, y). If a convergence criterion is met,
max
∣∣p1(D, y)− p0(D, y)∣∣ < εp, go to the next step. If not, update the price using a
Gauss - Seidel algorithm and go back to step 2.
A.7 Default as a source of insurance in a two-state model
We present a two period model with two states for the exogenous endowment shock:
state H, with probability π, where repayment takes place, and state L, with probability
1 − π, where default takes place. There are two instruments available, default and debt.
In this simple environment we switch off the deadweight cost of default, such that λ1 =
λ2 = λ. We have two instruments and two states, such that full insurance is attainable
by choosing the value of λ that allows for full risk sharing.
The problem is given by:
max
d,λ
U(y+ d, yN ) + βπU(yH − (1 + r)d, yN ) + β(1− π)U((1− λ)yL − λpLyN , yN ) (A.22)
s.t.
π(1 + r)d+ (1− π)λ(yL + pLyN ) = (1 + ρ)d (A.23)
Intertemporal optimality condition:
U1(y
L + d, yN ) = β(1 + ρ)U1(y
H − (1 + r)d, yN ) (A.24)
Full insurance: same consumption under both states
yH − (1 + r)d = (1− λ)yL − λpLyN (A.25)
Plugging (A.23) into (A.25):











π(yH − yL) + λ(yL + pLyN )
]
(A.26)


































The value of λ that solves for equation (A.27) allows for perfect insurance under this setup.
A.8 Optimal enforcement of creditor rights
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∫ ŷ
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Optimality condition with respect to debt:
U1(c1) =






2 )dF (y) (A.31)
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(y+pyN )dF (y) = 0 (A.33)
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y (y + py
N )dF (y)∫ ȳ
ŷ dF (y)
(A.34)
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2 )dF (y) (A.35)
A.8.2 Trade off with deadweight loss (λ1 > λ2)
max
d,λ2




















dF (y) + λ2
∫ ŷ
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Optimality condition with respect to debt:
U1(c1) =
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Chapter B: Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Pecuniary externalities in an environment with i.i.d. shocks and
with bonds with state contingent interest payments
When shocks are i.i.d., there is no pecuniary externality, as both the constrained
social planner and private agents are able to perfectly hedge against the income shock
using the state contingent asset and take non-state contingent debt up to the limit given
by the borrowing constraint given the impatience factor.
For any two states, y and y′, tradable consumption is given by:
cT,t = y +Rbt +R
y




t b̂t − bt+1 − b̂t+1 (B.2)
The interest rate is given by












In a more general setup, we can think about b̂ as a synthetic of a non-state contingent
asset and a swap instrument where borrowers exchange their tradable income endowment
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and get paid the expected value of the tradable income distribution. For a borrower who
goes short on b̂t units of the synthetic instrument in period t-1, he pays αyt +R and gets
αEt−1{yt} per unit in period t. Therefore, the budget constraint is the same as before:
cT,t + ptcN,t = yt +Rbt − bt+1 − b̂t+1 + [R+ α(yt − Et−1yt)]b̂t (B.5)
B.2 Pecuniary externalities with and without access to debt with









t cNt = y
T
t − bt+1 +Rbt − b̂t+1 +R
y











with multiplier ξt (B.7)
Euler equation for regular debt (bt+1)
U1(ct) = βREt {U1(ct+1)}+ ξt (B.8)











The interest payment for b̂ is given by:
Ryt = R+ α(yt − Et−1yt) (B.10)
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Plugging it into the previous equation, we get:
U1(ct) = βREt {U1(ct+1)}+ αβcov (yt+1, U1(ct+1)) + ξt (B.11)
Lower precautionary savings with access to b̂ are shown by the fact that:
cov (yt+1, U1(ct+1)) < 0 (B.12)
Procyclical interest payments makes it less likely to hit the collateral constraint, so
agents need to accumulate less precautionary savings to insure against this risk. Higher
individual debt increases the probability of being financially constrained next period if
borrowers get a low income shock, but due to lower interest payments in the procyclical
case, the tightening of the constraint is less severe and it allows for more debt rollover





















with multiplier ξt (B.15)
Euler equation for regular debt (bt+1)
































































Using (B.10), we can simplify this to:























By comparing equations (B.16) and (B.18), we can show that access to b̂ lowers
precautionary savings because:








Procyclical interest payments leads to higher interest payments in good times with
higher consumption (and lower marginal utility of consumption). The second term is also
negative because it is more likely for agents to be financially constrained in bad times, as
they need to borrow more to smooth consumption, hence the shadow price of the collateral
constraint is higher is periods of low income.
Comparing equations (B.8) and (B.16), we observe that when agents only have









Similar to the results in Bianchi (2011) and Korinek (2010), in an environment
with a single non-state contingent bond, private agents who ignore the effect of individual
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borrowing on the valuation of collateral of other agents borrow more than socially optimal
and therefore face financial crises more frequently.
U1(c
CE





t → −bCEt+1 > −bSPt+1 (B.20)










Similarly, private borrowers ignore the effect of their individual borrowing on the
valuation of collateral of other agents. Higher individual debt leads to a higher probability
of being financially constrained next period, which results in inability to rollover debt and
leads to capital outflows and real depreciation. This in turn lowers the value of collateral
for other agents in the economy and hence leads to larger capital outflows.
However, by comparing the two pecuniary externality terms, we can see that the
feedback effect through the valuation of collateral is milder when there is access to b̂.
Higher individual debt leads to a higher probability of being financially constrained next
period if borrowers get a low income shock. However, it is less likely to be financially
constrained if the interest payment is procyclical, as a low income shock is partially offset
by the lower debt service, so that there is more space for debt rollover. This in turn makes
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